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The aim of this paper is to analyze bank competition in Russia by measuring the market 
power of Russian banks and its determinants over the period 2001-2007 with the Lerner 
index. Earlier studies on bank competition have focused on developed countries whereas 
this paper contributes to the analysis of bank competition in emerging markets. We find 
that bank competition has only slightly improved during the period studied. The mean 
Lerner index for Russian banks is of the same magnitude as those observed in developed 
countries,  which suggests that the  Russian banking industry is  not plagued by weak 
competition. Furthermore, we find no greater market power for state-controlled banks nor 
less  market power for foreign-owned banks. We would  consequently qualify the 
procompetitive role of foreign bank entry and privatization. Finally, our analysis of the 
determinants of market power enables the identification of several factors that influence 
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I. Introduction 
In the wake of major structural changes in banking industries around the globe, the 
impact of bank competition on economic growth has generated increasing interest in the 
literature of recent years. Since banks play a key role in the financing of the economy, 
changes in bank competition are supposed to exert an impact on access to bank finance in 
the form of lower loan rates or relaxing of financing constraints (Cetorelli and Gambera, 
2001; Carbo-Valverde,  Rodriguez-Fernandez and Udell, 2009).  Such developments 
would suggest a positive impact of bank competition on economic growth (Claessens and 
Laeven, 2005). 
Bank competition is even more important for economic growth in emerging 
countries. First, these countries are characterized by low ratios of credit to GDP, which 
may  be a result  of  the financing obstacles created by subdued  banking  competition. 
Second, bank lending is the leading source of external finance in these countries, owing 
notably to underdeveloped capital markets. In spite of this, earlier studies investigating 
the level and the determinants of bank competition focus instead on developed countries 
(e.g. Fernandez de Guevara, Maudos and Perez, 2005). 
Russia is a very interesting example of such an emerging market. Bank lending is 
stunningly low, with a ratio of domestic credit to GDP of 25.7% in 2005, compared with 
a world average of 55.8% (EBRD, 2006). At the same time, bank lending represents the 
largest source of external finance for companies
1
Our aim in this paper is to analyze bank competition in Russia in the recent years 
by measuring the market power of Russian banks over the period 2001-2007. We utilize a 
rich panel dataset from the financial information agency Interfax and the Central Bank of 
Russia, which provides quarterly data for all Russian banks. In line with recent studies on 
bank competition (Fernandez de Guevara, Maudos and Perez, 2005; Solis and Maudos, 
2008;  Berger, Klapper and Turk-Ariss, 2009; Carbo-Valverde  et al., 2009), bank 
. This picture has not changed despite 
impressive economic and banking-sector growth in recent years, including a doubling of 
the ratio of banking sector assets to GDP. 
                                                 
1  The 2009 OECD report on Russia also stresses the importance of bank lending by mentioning that 
“Russia has seen the rapid evolution of securities markets and other non-bank financial activity, especially 
in the past 8 years or so, but banking still accounts for almost all financial intermediation” (OECD, 2009, 
p.122) 3 
 
competition is measured by the Lerner index. This measure of market power directly 
infers a bank’s conduct and then informs on the actual behavior of the bank. 
First, we measure the level and the evolution of the market power of Russian banks 
during the period of study. We assess the level of market power of banks in Russia and 
compare it with other countries. We also investigate whether strong economic growth 
influenced banking competition in recent years. 
Second, we investigate whether market power depends  on  ownership. Russian 
banking is characterized by the coexistence of three different types of banks: state-
controlled banks, domestic private banks, foreign-owned banks. We analyze whether the 
privatization of state-controlled banks or relaxing of foreign bank entry contribute to 
reducing market power in the Russian banking industry. 
Third, we analyze the determinants of market power for Russian banks. This is 
done to provide relevant insights for economic policy, by identifying factors which can 
be influenced so as to enhance bank competition. Furthermore, this analysis allows us to 
examine the extent to which these determinants are similar to those observed in other 
countries. Indeed, earlier studies on determinants of banks’ market power have all looked 
at developed countries (Fernandez de Guevara, Maudos and Perez, 2005; Fernandez de 
Guevara and Maudos, 2007). Therefore, this identification of the determinants of banks’ 
market power is a significant contribution to  the analysis of bank competition in 
emerging countries. 
The rest of the article is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the Russian 
banking industry. Section 3 sets out the methodology and data. Section 4 presents the 
results, and Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
II. Russian banking sector, 1998-2008 
In stark contrast to the volatile 1990s and the financial and economic crisis of 
1998, the last ten years have witnessed a Russian banking sector starting to resemble 
banking sectors in many other emerging economies. Russian banks by and large take in 
retail deposits, provide  credits  to  both households and enterprises, engage in fairly 4 
 
standard operations in capital markets, and  issue bonds;  some even participate in 
international loan syndications.  
The Russian ruble has been freely convertible since July 2006, and there are no 
restrictions on the capital account. Payments do flow across Russia’s eleven time zones 
fairly reliably, several foreign banks have found their way into the top-10 banks, and 
even bank cards are in common use in the big cities. On the surface therefore, Russia’s 
banking sector looks like  that of a typical emerging  economy.  Deeper investigation 
however reveals a number of structural features uncommon for other European emerging 
economies.  
The main  difference is that no major bank privatization has  ever occurred in 
Russia on the scale that was seen in Central European countries. The state has retained 
control over some of the Soviet-era sectoral banks, notably the major savings bank 
Sberbank and foreign-trade banks VTB-Vnestorgbank and VEB-Vnesekonbank. The 
large state-controlled banks have been significant players in the market throughout the 
post-Soviet period.  
The corollary of this is that the private banks are mostly de novo banks, 
established in the early 1990s. Russia still has a very large number of private banks, most 
of them miniscule. Many of them are believed to be pocket-banks of an industrial group 
and to have little if any exposure to the interbank markets. There were more than 1300 
banks operating in Russia in 2000. This number has decreased significantly over the last 
ten years even though the banking sector as a whole has grown substantially (see Table 
1). 
Due to the sheer  size of the country, Russia’s banking system entails  wide 
regional variation. Roughly half of the banks are registered in the capital, Moscow City, 
and the other half are headquartered in the rest of Russia’s 86 regions. Only the larger 
banks have regional networks to speak of, and the majority of Russian banks do not 
conduct major operations outside their home regions. Out of the 1100 banks operating in 
2008,  only  less than 300 have branch offices in other regions (CBR). Despite the 
impressive number of banks, there is wide regional variation in availability of banking 
services. Some of the remote regions in Russia are being served only by the state savings 
bank, Sberbank, and a handful  of tiny private banks. In regions with larger cities, 5 
 
however, market concentration can be very low. The robust  growth in the  banking 
industry over the last decade has however clearly widened the scope of banking services 
available also outside Moscow. Berkowitz and DeJong (2008) argue that the emergence 
of bank credit has indeed been an important engine for real income growth across 
Russian regions since 2000.  
The financial crisis in 1998 led to an increase in state’s share in the banking 
sector, due to some  bank takeovers and to deposit flight to state-controlled  banks, 
understood to have implicit state guarantees. The crisis, however, also initiated a number 
of financial sector reforms that particularly favored  private banks. The single most 
important reform was the introduction of a deposit insurance scheme in 2004, which was 
hoped to level the playing field between state-controlled and private banks.
2
The reforms have clearly improved the legal environment, but they have not 
reduced the share of state-controlled banks in the Russian banking industry. According to 
Vernikov (2009), the share of the five largest state-related banking groups (Sberbank, 
VTB Group, Gazprombank Group, Rosselkhozbank, and Bank Moskvy) in total banking 
sector assets increased from 35% in 2001 to 49% in 2009. The current financial crisis has 
further increased the state’s share in the sector. Vernikov (2009) estimates the share of 
predominantly state-owned banks in total banking sector assets at 56% in July 2009.  
 The state 
also, by 2004, withdrew its minority shareholdings in many medium and small-scale 
private banks. The plans to partly privatize the county’s top banks, Sberbank and VTB, 
ended in large IPOs in 2007  that  resulted  in  40  % and 23% private shareholdings 
respectively in the two banks. No further privatization of the large state-owned banks is 
planned.  
Foreign bank penetration in Russia has been modest, albeit on the increase. There 
are no binding legal barriers to foreign bank entry, but the low foreign bank penetration 
can be partly explained by memories of the 1998 crisis when many foreign investors 
incurred huge losses. Moreover, the legal and regulatory environment in Russia is only 
slowly beginning to resemble that of many other transition countries. Foreign-owned 
banks are however becoming increasingly important. The number of banks with foreign 
                                                 
2 For the effects of the introduction of the deposit insurance scheme and other reform packages see e.g. 
OECD (2009) and Berglöf and Lehmann (2009). 6 
 
ownership has increased from 174 in 2000 to 228 at the end of June 2009
3
In contrast to other emerging economies with similar income levels, the level of 
financial intermediation by banks is very low in Russia. However, the growth of the 
banking sector has been impressive since 2001. Since then,  bank credit flows  to  the 
private sector have increased by more than 20 percent of GDP, reaching 36% at the end 
of 2007 (CBR). The spectacular growth rates were a product of an  improving 
macroeconomic environment, higher income levels, availability of cheap foreign funding 
and domestic institutional reforms. 
. In early 2008 
two of the top-10 banks in Russia were foreign-owned. The share of foreign-owned banks 




   
III.1 Lerner index 
Empirical research provides some tools for measuring bank competition. These can 
be broken down into the traditional Industrial Organization (IO) and new empirical IO 
approaches. The traditional IO approach proposes tests of market structure to assess bank 
competition based on the Structure Conduct Performance (SCP) model. The SCP 
hypothesis argues that greater concentration causes less competitive bank conduct and 
leads to higher bank profitability. According to this, competition can be measured by 
concentration indices such as market share of the largest banks or the Herfindahl index. 
The new empirical IO approach provides non-structural tests to circumvent the 
problems  connected to inferring competition  from indirect proxies such as market 
structure or market shares under  the traditional IO approach. In comparison, non-
structural measures measure banks’ conduct directly using micro-level bank data. 
Following the new empirical IO approach, we measure bank competition by the 
Lerner index, which is based on individual bank-level data. The Lerner index has been 
widely used in recent studies on bank competition and market power (e.g. Solis and 
                                                 
3 Of 228 banks with foreign ownership, there were 106 with majority foreign ownership (i.e. more than 
50%). 7 
 
Maudos, 2008, Carbo-Valverde  et al., 2009).  The Lerner index  is defined as the 
difference between a bank's price and the marginal cost, divided by the price. The index 
values range from a maximum of 1 to a minimum of zero, with higher numbers indicating 
greater market power and hence less competition. The Lerner index in fact represents the 
extent to which a particular bank has market power to set its price above marginal cost. A 
zero value indicates perfect competition and no monopoly power.  
The price is computed by estimating the average price of bank production (proxied 
by total assets) as the ratio of total revenue to total assets, following Fernandez de 
Guevara, Maudos and Perez (2005),  Carbo-Valverde  et al. (2009), and  others.  The 
marginal cost is estimated on the basis of a translog cost function with one output (total 
assets) and three input prices (price of labor, price of physical capital, and price of 
borrowed funds). Symmetry and linear homogeneity restrictions in input prices are 
imposed. The cost function is specified as 
( ) ε γ β β α α α + + + + + + = ∑ ∑∑ ∑
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where TC denotes total costs, y total assets, w1 the price of labor (ratio of personnel 
expenses to total assets)
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, w2 the price of physical capital (ratio of other non-interest 
expenses to fixed assets), w3 the price of borrowed funds (ratio of interest paid to total 
funding). Total costs are the sum of personnel expenses, other non-interest expenses and 
interest  paid. The indices for each bank  and time  have been dropped  from the 
presentation for the sake of simplicity. The estimated coefficients of the cost function are 
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Once marginal cost is estimated and the price of output computed we can calculate 
the Lerner index for each bank and obtain a direct measure of bank competition. 
 
                                                 
4 As our database does not provide information on the number of employees, we use this proxy variable for 
the price of labor, following Fernandez de Guevara, Maudos and Perez (2007) and Karas, Schoors and 
Weill (2010) among others. 8 
 
III.2 Data and variables 
We use quarterly bank-level data from the financial information agency Interfax. 
Our sample is composed of observations from the first quarter of 2001 to the first quarter 
of 2007. To ensure that a bank carries out lending activities, we keep only banks with 
more than 5% of loans in total assets. Our final sample consists of over 24,000 bank 
quarter observations, which are available for the estimations. The data on bank foreign 
ownership is from the Central Bank of Russia (CBR). We define a bank to be foreign-
owned if the foreign ownership share in its assets exceeds 50%. State-controlled banks 
are defined using the list provided in Vernikov (2007). Information on bank branches by 
regions is collected from the CBR website.  Regional data are from Rosstat and the 
investor risk rating from the Russian rating agency ExpertRA
5
In the estimations, we analyze the determinants of the market power of Russian 
banks. To do so, we perform regressions of the Lerner index measuring market power on 
a set of variables. The selection of variables is based on two  former studies on the 
determinants of market power: Fernandez de Guevara, Maudos and Perez (2005) 
(hereafter FMP), Fernandez de Guevara and Maudos (2007)  (hereafter FM).  Both  of 
these studies investigate the determinants of banks’ market power by computing Lerner 
indices, but they differ in their geographical scope. While FM (2007) focus on Spanish 
banks,  FMP (2005) consider the five largest EU banking markets (France, Germany, 
Italy, Spain, the UK). Previous studies point out four key determinants of market power: 
concentration, size, elasticity of demand, and risk. 
. 
Herfindahl Index, as used to measure concentration, is defined as the Herfindahl 
index for assets computed at the regional level. Taking into account the size of Russian 
territory and great regional variability, the regional market is the relevant market for 
evaluating competition. We use distribution of branch offices as a proxy for banking 
output by region for calculating the Herfindahl index for a given region. The Herfindahl 
index for a bank thus measures the concentration of the markets in which it operates, 
using as weights the distribution of its branch networks in the regions.  This variable is 
useful  for  checking  whether a positive  link exists between concentration and market 
power. The existence of such a link would be a strong argument, based on a need for 
                                                 
5 Available at http://www.raexpert.ru/ratings/regions/. 9 
 
greater competition, against the consolidation of the Russian banking industry. While 
also using the Herfindahl index to measure concentration, FMP (2005) and FM (2007) 
interestingly find no significant coefficient for this variable. 
We use the logarithm of total assets (Log(Assets)) to measure size. We also include 
the squared term (Log(Assets)²) in the estimations to consider possible nonlinearity in the 
relationship between size and market power. There are several reasons for including this 
variable. First, as there have been many bank failures in Russia in recent years, being 
“too big to fail” can play a role by affording an advantage to large banks in attracting 
depositors, which could lead to wider margins. Second, economies of scale may exist, 
allowing the largest banks to benefit from lower costs. Third, existence of a relationship 
between size and market power would also contribute to the debate on consolidation in 
the Russian banking industry. A positive link would argue against a pro-merger policy for 
competitive reasons. 
Loans to Industrial Production is calculated as a weighted average of the loans-to-
industrial-production ratios of regions in which a given bank has operations. Similar to 
the case of concentration, we use weights based on the distribution of branch offices in 
regions.  The loans-to-industrial-production ratio is used to proxy the elasticity of 
demand, following FM (2007) who use the ratio of loans to GDP at regional level for a 
similar purpose. The theory stresses that greater elasticity of demand through a lower 
value of this ratio, i.e. lower dependence on bank financing, results in less market power 
for banks. A positive relationship is thus expected between this ratio and market power.  
Further, we account for the ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans to measure 
risk (Nonperforming Loans).  This ratio is a standard measure of risk in the banking 
literature (e.g. Berger and DeYoung, 1997). It is used in the estimations since a higher 
nonperforming loans ratio  is expected to reduce market power  because of the losses 
involved. Furthermore,  greater risk could  divert depositors from the bank and hence 
increase the bank’s costs of attracting clients. Both FMP (2005) and FM (2007) use the 
ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans. They stress that the nonperforming loans ratio 
would be a better measure of risk, but it cannot be used, for data availability reasons.  
Next to the four key determinants, we add some variables of particular interest for 
Russian banks. We add dummy variables for foreign ownership (Foreign Ownership) and 10 
 
state ownership (State Ownership), in accordance with the potential role of ownership. 
We  show  that  there are differences in market power between different ownership 
categories, which evolve over time; hence the link between these ownership forms and 
market power is ambiguous over the period.  Furthermore, we  include a variable for 
investor risk, which includes legal, economic, financial, social, criminal, ecological and 
administrative components (Investor Risk). Indeed a major concern in Russia is the weak 
institutional environment,  which results in a notably  high level of corruption by 
international standards (Weill, 2008).  Studies have however shown the existence of 
strong differences in institutional environment among Russian regions, so the potential 
impact of investor risk should be considered. Finally, we control for the business cycle by 
including regional growth of industrial production (Industrial Growth). 
Dummy variables for each quarter  and  each year are also included in the 
estimations, to control for seasonal and yearly effects.  
Descriptive statistics for all variables are reported in Table 2. 
 
IV. Results 
This section provides the analysis of market power of Russian banks. We begin by 
providing information on the level and evolution of the Lerner index for Russian banks. 
We then investigate whether these indices differ by bank ownership. Next we analyze the 
determinants of market power of Russian banks. 
 
IV.1 Market power of Russian banks 
We present the estimates of market power for Russian banks for each year in Table 
3. We observe that the average Lerner index for the period is 21.4%. Therefore, market 
power of banks in Russia is very similar to that observed in developed countries. For 
instance, Fernandez de Guevara and Maudos (2007) find yearly mean Lerner indices 
between 16.9% and 24.9% for Spanish banks, while Carbo-Valverde  and al. (2009) 
observe mean Lerner indices at the country level ranging from 11% to 22% for EU 
countries, with an EU mean of 16%
6
                                                 
6 It is necessary to point out that the data we use are based on RAS, which differ from IFRS data. 
. 11 
 
In dynamic terms, the evolution of the Lerner index shows a relatively stable level 
of bank competition over the period with yearly means ranging from 20.1% to 21.4% and 
a reduction of the variability of Lerner indices over time. We nonetheless observe a slight 
decrease over the period, from 21.4% in 2001 to 20.4% in 2007, which is statistically 
significant. 
The analysis of the mean  Lerner index  for the Russian banking industry  is of 
utmost interest to investigate average  bank behavior.  However,  the appraisal of the 
macroeconomic effects of changes in bank competition notably through changes in loan 
rates needs to consider differently banks according to their market share. As mentioned 
above, there are huge differences in size among Russian banks and, notably, a market 
share of about 30% for the largest bank (Sberbank). Therefore, we also measure the mean 
Lerner index weighted by market shares of banks in total banking sector assets. These 
figures are also presented in Table 3. 
We point out two striking findings. On the one hand, the trend for the mean 
weighted Lerner index is similar to the one observed with the standard mean Lerner 
index. We still observe a slight reduction of the market power, supporting the view of 
moderately enhanced bank competition. On the other hand, the mean weighted Lerner 
index has lower values than the standard Lerner index, which supports the view of a level 
of bank competition in Russia similar to that in other countries.  
As a consequence, our main finding is that, in spite of the major changes in Russia 
in recent years, including strong economic growth and banking reforms (e.g. the deposit 
insurance scheme), bank competition has only slightly improved in recent years. One can 
notably wonder why the changes in the banking industry, such as the increasing market 
share for foreign banks, have not enhanced bank competition. To this end, it is interesting 
to investigate market power by ownership type. 
 
IV.2 Market power by ownership type 
As mentioned above, the Russian banking industry is characterized by a 
persistently large market share for state-controlled banks and a relatively small market 
share of foreign-owned banks, in comparison with the other transition countries. Thus, it 
is interesting to investigate how these characteristics influence banks’ behavior in Russia. 12 
 
We investigate whether foreign-owned, state-controlled and domestic private banks 
differ in market power and thus aim to uncover whether the ownership structure of the 
Russian banking industry affects bank competition. Table 4 presents the mean Lerner 
indices for each category of banks and for each year. Several conclusions emerge. 
First, the ranking of categories in terms of market power has been changing over 
the period. In 2001, market power of domestic private banks was on average significantly 
higher than for  foreign-owned banks but significantly lower than for  state-controlled 
banks. In 2002, market power of state-controlled banks was not significantly different 
from that of domestic private and foreign-owned banks. Then, from 2003 to 2007, state-
controlled banks have significantly less market power than foreign-owned and domestic 
private banks, while both of these latter categories do not have significantly different 
market power. Thus, the conclusions drawn at first glance, considering only mean market 
power levels over the period, are misleading. Indeed this quick look shows a decreasing 
degree of market power for all categories of banks, even though this pattern has not been 
constant over time. 
Second, market power of state-controlled banks was decreased considerably over 
the period, with a significant drop from 24% in 2001 to 15.5% in 2007. This reduction in 
market power can be explained by the weakening of their competitive advantage in terms 
of safety. Indeed state-controlled banks used to have an advantage in collecting deposits, 
as their ownership status has prevented them from going bankrupt. This advantage was 
particularly important in Russia, where more than 2000 banks have been liquidated or 
have vanished since the beginning of transition. As a consequence, demand may have 
been less elastic for state-controlled banks than for other banks, as clients were willing to 
pay more to have safe deposits. Nevertheless, this competitive advantage has been 
reduced  over  time,  for two reasons. On the one hand, macroeconomic stability has 
considerably reduced financial instability, as indicated by the reduction in the average 
ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans for Russian banks.  On the other hand, a 
deposit insurance scheme was implemented in 2004, leading to the same protection for 
small depositors in state-controlled and in the other banks as well. 
Third,  market power has significantly  improved for foreign-owned banks,  from 
15% in 2001 to 20.1% in 2007. Several factors may explain this evolution. On the one 13 
 
hand, banking markets are characterized by switching costs, which prevent new 
competitors to be as competitive as incumbents in attracting customers (Kim, Kliger and 
Vale, 2001). Therefore, following their entry, foreign-owned banks had incentives to 
charge lower prices than other banks. However, after attracting customers, foreign-owned 
banks may have been gradually raising their prices, to become standard banks, which is 
confirmed by the fact that their market power is not significantly different from the other 
(domestic) private banks. On the other hand, the increase in market power of foreign-
owned banks may also derive from the fact that, with the increasing revenue of Russian 
firms and households, some of these banks have gradually evolved towards an upmarket 
niche, allowing them to charge higher prices. 
Fourth, market power of domestic private banks has decreased slightly but 
significantly over the period,  from 21.5% in 2001 to 20.6% in 2007.  This moderate 
evolution may be the result of the competitive pressures resulting from foreign-owned 
banks. Indeed, at the beginning of the period, foreign-owned banks had lower market 
power than domestic private banks, which may give the latter an incentive to reduce their 
margins. In their analysis of the effects of foreign bank entry on a sample of developed 
and developing countries, Claessens, Demirgüc-Kunt and Huizinga (2001) support this 
view by concluding that increased presence of foreign banks is associated with a 
reduction  in domestic banks’  margins.  Available empirical evidence for Russia 
(Fungáčová and Poghosyan, 2009) shows that in the 2000s the margins of domestic banks 
in Russia, both state-controlled and private ones, have indeed been decreasing towards 
the level of margins in foreign-owned banks. 
Thus, our major finding is for the existence of significant differences in market 
power of banks depending on ownership. These differences are of utmost interest for 
understanding the main pattern of the evolution of bank competition over the period, but 
they also inform policy recommendations concerning competition. 
Indeed we observe that our finding of decreasing  market power  over time for 
Russian banks – which was observed for all Russian banks, whether considered as equal 
or weighted by market share (i.e. enabling a strong influence of state-controlled banks) - 
is driven by the behavior of state-controlled and domestic private banks, and not at all by 
the behavior of foreign-owned banks. We cannot conclude that foreign bank entry per se 14 
 
promotes  competition.  However,  the competitive pressures  exerted by foreign-owned 
banks may have contributed to the reduction in the market power of domestic banks. 
Thus, our findings do not contradict the commonly accepted view in the literature that 
foreign bank presence is associated with greater competition in the banking market (e.g. 
Claessens and Laeven, 2004). Furthermore, the considerable reduction of market power 
for state-controlled banks over time, resulting in less market power among all categories 
of banks, does not argue for their privatization for competitive reasons. 
 
IV.3 Determinants of market power of Russian banks 
We now investigate the determinants of market power for Russian banks. In line 
with former studies, we perform random-effects regressions of Lerner indices on a set of 
variables. The results are displayed in Table 5. Four different estimations are done, to 
check the sensitivity of the results. The first estimation includes all tested determinants as 
defined above (column 1). This is the benchmark specification. The second estimation 
excludes  the regional  variables (Herfindahl Index, Loans to Industrial Production, 
Investor Risk, Industrial Growth) (column 2). The third replaces two determinants by 
alternative variables (column 3). Namely, we use the market share of the three largest 
banks (Market Share of big 3) instead of the Herfindahl index to measure concentration, 
and the ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans (Loan Loss Provisions) instead of 
nonperforming loans ratio to measure risk. This specification helps us check whether our 
results are sensitive to the choice of variables to proxy the determinants. The fourth 
estimation (column 4) uses lagged values in all determinants. This estimation is helpful, 
as the tested determinants may influence market power with a lag. We use a lag of 3 
months to minimize the reduction in the number of observations. 
Herfindahl Index has a significantly positive impact on market power as measured 
by Lerner index. When this variable is replaced by Market Share of big 3, the result is 
similar. This is in line with the intuitive hypothesis that a more concentrated banking 
industry contributes to increasing market power of banks. Nonetheless it differs from the 
non-significant link found for  Western European countries (FMP, 2005; FM, 2007). 
Moreover, it indicates that consolidation of the Russian banking industry, motivated by 
scale economies or financial stability, might hamper bank competition. 15 
 
The coefficient for Log(Assets)  is  significant and positive,  which  suggests  a 
positive impact of size on market power. However, the significantly negative coefficient 
of Log(Assets)² shows that this relationship is nonlinear. This suggests that increasing 
size enhances market power up to a certain point beyond which greater size becomes 
detrimental for market power. In other words, small-sized banks and larger banks should 
have less market power than medium-sized banks. This finding has several implications. 
First, the “too big to fail” argument, which could carry a competitive advantage in Russia 
where bank failures have been common during the last decade, is not sufficient to explain 
banks’ market power, however large they are. Second, it suggests that economies of scale 
may not be strong enough to motivate increased size. Nevertheless further research would 
be needed to estimate the economies of scale in the Russian banking industry. Third, 
larger banks resulting from mergers may not necessarily hamper competition. Comparing 
our results for Russian banks to former studies, we notice that they are in line with the 
findings of FMP (2005) on European banks, who also find a positive coefficient for size 
but negative for squared size. On the other hand, our findings differ from the results in 
the FM (2007) study for Spanish banks. 
The estimated coefficient for Loans to Industrial Production, which is an inverse 
measure of the elasticity of demand, is significantly positive. This finding accords with 
our expectations, as a lower ratio means greater elasticity of demand via less dependence 
on bank financing, and consequently less market power. This validation of the theoretical 
expectation differs from  the findings in former studies, as FM (2007) find  a non-
significant coefficient and FMP (2005) find a coefficient which is significantly either 
positive or negative. 
Nonperforming Loans, which measures risk, has a significantly negative estimated 
coefficient. Replacing this variable by Loan Loss Provisions, we obtain the same result. 
This finding can be explained by the reduction of margins caused by loan losses, but also 
in the Russian context, by the diversion of depositors from banks with greater loan losses. 
The literature provides evidence of depositor’s discipline from Russia (see e.g. Karas, 
Pyle and Schoors, 2010). It is of interest to observe that the measure used for risk in FMP 
(2005) and FM (2007), the ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans, is not significant. 16 
 
So here again the theoretical expectations seem to be valid for Russia rather than for 
developed countries. 
Ownership dummies are not significant. This accords with the observation in the 
above  subsection that neither  foreign-owned nor state-controlled banks consistently 
outperform or underperform domestic private banks in market power over the period of 
analysis. 
Finally, both variables controlling for the macroeconomic and the institutional 
environment are significant. The coefficient is positive for Industrial Growth, which is an 
interesting finding because  it shows that economic expansion is not necessarily 
associated with greater banking competition, as we have seen for the Russian banking 
market as a whole. The significance of Investor Risk variable supports the view that 
institutional environment influences the behavior of Russian banks. The positive sign of 
the coefficient may be explained by the fact that greater investor risk prevents new 
competitors from entering the market. 
Thus, the analysis of the determinants of market power for Russian banks has 
helped us identify the factors which influence bank competition. The fact that our main 
results have not changed in alternative specifications supports their robustness. In a 
nutshell, we observe that procompetitive policies in Russia do not include the prohibition 
of mergers, the relaxed entry of foreign banks or the privatization. Indeed neither large 




This paper analyses bank competition in Russia during the period 2001-2007. Our 
findings can be summarized as follows. First, bank competition only slightly improved 
between 2001 and 2007. Nevertheless, the level of bank competition is very similar to 
that observed in the developed countries. Russian banking industry does not seem to 
suffer from excessive market power of  banks.  Second, no category  of banks among 
domestic private banks, state-controlled banks, and foreign-owned banks, has been 
persistently more or less competitive than the others. We observe enhanced market power 
for foreign-owned banks and reduced market power for state-controlled banks over the 17 
 
period, leading to the finding that the most competitive banks were foreign-owned banks 
at the beginning of the period, and state-owned banks at the end of the period. Third, our 
investigation of the determinants of market power identifies the roles of concentration 
and risk, the absence of impact of ownership, and the nonlinear influence of size, among 
others things. 
In a nutshell, our findings qualify the need for procompetitive policy in the Russian 
banking industry. Indeed, Russia does not suffer from particularly weak bank 
competition. Furthermore, the standard policies for promoting competition do not find 
support here. Namely, the relaxed entry of foreign banks and the privatization of state-
owned banks would not likely lead to greater competition. Moreover, the prohibition of 
mergers to limit bank size may also not favour competition, as the relationship between 
size and market power is an inverse U-curve. 
This conclusion should be related to the finding from Fungáčová and Weill (2009) 
that greater bank competition enhances the occurrence of bank failures. Indeed, when 
considering together this possible danger of enhancing bank competition in a country 
plagued by financial instability  and our findings on  the  fairly  normal level of bank 
competition in Russia and the difficulties of designing a procompetitive policy, one can 
reasonably wonder whether bank competition should be promoted  in this country. 
Nevertheless, this study is only the first one to investigate bank competition in Russia, 
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Main indicators of banking system development in Russia, 2000-2008  
 
 
  2000  2002  2004  2006  2008 
Domestic credit to private sector/ GDP  12  17  23  30  40 
Bank assets / GDP  32  38  43  52  67 
Number of registered banks  1 311  1 329  1 299  1 189  1 108 
Asset share of foreign-owned banks  9.5  8  8  12  19 
  Source: CBR, EBRD for asset share of foreign-owned banks 








  Mean  Median  St. deviation 
Lerner index  0.214  0.209  0.115 
Logarithm of assets  6.355  6.320  1.808 
Nonperforming loans  0.019  0.005  0.045 
Herfindahl index  0.155  0.122  0.159 
Loans to industrial production   4.907  2.270  6.093 
Industrial growth  0.232  0.215  0.144 













Yearly Lerner indexes 
 
 
Year  No. of obs.  Mean  Median  St. deviation  Mean weighted 
by size 
2001  3985  0.215  0.212  0.124  0.148 
2002  3941  0.218  0.212  0.120  0.156 
2003  4279  0.220  0.217  0.119  0.145 
2004  4294  0.217  0.211  0.114  0.136 
2005  4156  0.211  0.205  0.105  0.150 
2006  2716  0.201  0.197  0.102  0.110 
2007  855  0.204  0.201  0.103  0.103 





Lerner indices by ownership 
 
 
  STATE-CONTROLLED  FOREIGN MAJORITY  PRIVATE 
Year  Obs.  Mean  Median  St.dev.  Obs.  Mean  Median  St.dev.  Obs.  Mean  Median  St.dev. 
2001  109  0.240  0.242  0.132  99  0.149  0.173  0.162  3777  0.216  0.212  0.122 
2002  107  0.209  0.202  0.111  104  0.195  0.192  0.134  3730  0.219  0.212  0.120 
2003  117  0.201  0.200  0.107  110  0.237  0.225  0.148  4052  0.220  0.218  0.118 
2004  122  0.176  0.172  0.110  112  0.211  0.220  0.158  4060  0.218  0.212  0.112 
2005  123  0.178  0.171  0.098  127  0.222  0.213  0.133  3906  0.212  0.206  0.104 
2006  101  0.160  0.158  0.107  109  0.218  0.204  0.127  2506  0.202  0.198  0.100 
2007  28  0.155  0.161  0.090  38  0.201  0.203  0.115  789  0.206  0.202  0.103 





Determinants of market power 
 
Random effect estimations where the dependent variable is Lerner index. Standard errors appear 
in parentheses below estimated coefficients. *, **, *** denote an estimate significantly different 
from 0 at the 10%, 5% or 1% level. Seasonal and yearly dummy variables and constant included 
but not reported. 
 








Log (Assets)  0.022***  0.020***  0.023***  0.012*** 
(0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Log (Assets) ²   -0.002***   -0.002***   -0.002***   -0.002*** 
(0.0002)  (0.0002)  (0.0002)  (0.0002) 
Nonperforming loans   -0.135***   -0.131***     -0.202*** 
(0.017)  (0.017)    (0.021) 
Loan loss provisions       -0.037***   
    (0.012)   
State ownership  -0.003  1.E-05  -0.002  1.E-05 
(0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012) 
Foreign ownership  -0.002  -0.003  -0.003  0.009 
(0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.008) 
Herfindahl index  0.029***      0.024*** 
(0.009)      (0.010) 
Market share of big 3 
    0.021***   
    (0.006)   
Loans to industrial 
production 
0.001***    0.001***  0.001*** 
(0.0002)    (0.0002)  (0.0002) 
Industrial growth  0.011*    0.011*  0.003 
(0.006)    (0.006)  (0.006) 
Investor risk  0.0003***      0.0002*** 
(0.0001)      (0.0001) 
R
2  0.05  0.04  0.04  0.06 
N  24226  24226  24226  21584 
Number of banks  1312  1312  1312  1284 
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